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RELIGION AND CHILD CUSTODY
Carl E. Schneider*
And he said unto them, Render therefore unto Caesar the things
which be Caesar's, and unto God the things which be God's.
Luke 20:25.
I.
In this Essay, I want to reflect on some problems at the inter-
section of religion, law, and the family. Specifically, I will
explore the ways courts may consider a parent's religiously
motivated behavior in making decisions about the custody of
children. More precisely still, I will ask two questions. First,
may a court refuse to award custody because of a parent's
religiously motivated behavior in a dispute between a natural
mother and a natural father? Second, when should a court
agree to resolve a dispute between divorced parents over the
religious upbringing of their children? These are topics of quiet
but growing importance, for as rates ofinterreligious marriage
and of divorce have risen, so has the incidence of these dis-
putes. Furthermore, these problems raise telling questions
about the tension between discretion and rules in law, about
the discords between religion and law, about the meaning of
pluralism in American life, and about the usefulness of rights
discourse in American law.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A version of this Essay was first
presented at the Fourth Annual Symposium on Law, Religion, and Ethics at Hamline
University, October 25, 1991, and at the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Symposium, Preservation of Minority Cultures (February 15, 1992). I am grateful to the
symposium participants for their helpful responses to what I said there. I am also glad
to thank John H. Garvey, Douglas Laycock, Stephen L. Pepper, Kent D. Syverud, and
Carol A. Weisbrod for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this piece. For
the reasons described in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1343 (1986), I do not adhere to all of the rules in THE BLUEBOOK= A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION (15th ed. 1991).
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Before I begin, let me say a few words about the scope of this
Essay. It is indeed an essay, and not a systematic survey of
the field. Such surveys have already been ably conducted.'
To replicate them would be wasteful and ridiculous excess.
Nor have I formally analyzed the constitutional doctrines that
might be summoned up in these cases. Rather than trekking
through the aridities of the Supreme Court's constitutional
formulae, I have preferred to inquire into how a culturally
various liberal democracy ought to handle these conflicts.2
Finally, I do not seek and doubt the existence of any unequivo-
cally correct answers to these perplexing and sometimes tragic
dilemmas. I will be content if I can identify the components
of these conflicts and explain why they are not only perplexing,
but may be unresolvable.
II.
One of the most frequent and troubling contexts in which
religious issues arise in custody disputes is where one parent
(in today's world, usually the father) claims that his wife's
religious beliefs lead her to behave in ways which would harm
the child were she given custody. To this claim, the mother
generally responds that to rely on religiously based behavior
in denying her custody would violate her free exercise rights.
How ought public policy understand that argument?
This question is most often discussed in terms of Quiner v.
Quiner,3 a case which states with unusual thoroughness the
standard arguments against considering the effects of religious
1. See Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor
in Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383 (1989); R. Collin
Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May be Unconstitutional: Religion as a
Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 25 (1981).
2. For a dryly devastating survey of those aidities, see ROBERT NAGEL, THE FORMULAIC
CONSTrruTION, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985). For more detailed explanations of why I have
eschewed the formalisms of constitutional analysis in favor of an attempt to confront
the real social and moral problems these cases raise, see Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest
Analysis inFourteenthAmendment "Privacy"Law: AnEssayonthe Constitutionalization
of Social Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1988); Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest
Analysis and the Channelling Function in Privacy Law, in PUBLiC VALUES IN CONSITUmONAL
LAW (Stephen Gottlieb ed., forthcoming 1993)
3. 59 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1967).
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beliefs in denying someone custody. We will therefore use
Quiner as a basis for our discussion.4
Linnea and Edward Quiner were both members of a funda-
mentalist Protestant sect called the Plymouth Brethren.
However, Mrs. Quiner belonged to a particularly strict subsect
called the Exclusive Brethren. The Exclusive Brethren do "not
affiliate with any outside organization" of any kind, vote or
participate in "civic, political or governmental activities," use
any form "of public or private entertainment," or read anything
except the Bible. Their children "are discouraged, if not
forbidden as sinful, from participating in all forms of extracur-
ricular activity." Nor may their children "visit or play with
other children in their homes, or in their own homes or
elsewhere," except school.5
Further, the Exclusive Brethren "dissociate" themselves from
all who are not Exclusive Brethren, including "Open Brethren"
like Mr. Quiner. Mrs. Quiner said that she "'would teach [her
son] to love his father as a son and as his father and to respect
him in every way and to obey him. I would not teach him to
hate his father at all.'"6 However, she "admitted she would
keep him away from his father if she could," and she agreed
that "children within the religious group are taught that others
outside the religious group [including Mr. Quiner] are
unclean."7
The trial court held that the Quiners' child John Edward
(who was around two years old at the time of the trial) should
be placed in his father's custody.' It observed that "mental
welfare" was part of the child's best interests and that that
term "includes the opportunities for intellectual, character and
4. By choosing Quiner as my starting point, I do not, of course, mean to suggest
that it represents the approach of every American jurisdiction. At least one court has
reached quite the opposite result. In Burnham v. Burnham, 304 N.W.2d 58 (Neb. 1981),
the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed a trial court and denied custody to a mother who
was a member of the Tridentine Catholic Church on the grounds that several of her beliefs
might "have an adverse impact on Jaime: (1) The belief that she [Jaime] is illegitimate;
(2) The willingness of Carolyn [the mother] to cut Jaime out of her life if she disobeys
the rules of the Tridentine Church; and (3) The racist views held by Carolyn and,
apparently, by her church." Id. at 61. However, as Professor Beschle reports, "Burnham
is unusual." Beschle, supra note 1, at 401. Quiner represents a probably preponderant
attitude, although courts have enunciated a variety of formulae for dealing with this
kind of case. For a survey of them, see id. at 396-406.
5. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 525 (trial court opinion).
6. Id. at 505 (quoting testimony of Mrs. Quiner).
7. Id. at 504-05.
8. Id. at 504.
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personality growth, and the development of those social graces
and amenities without which one cannot live comfortably or
successfully in a complex, integrated society."9 It concluded
that "the intellectually blighted social microcosm of the
Exclusive Brethren in which John Edward would be forceably
[sic] confined ... is more than likely to retard his mental
growth and personality development, would be inimical to his
welfare, and would severely handicap him in later years in
his struggle to achieve his goals of social and economic attain-
ment."' ° It was also concerned that the "wholesome relation-
ship between Edward and his son that is now growing" might
"begin to deteriorate and finally be destroyed as John Edward
is taught to believe that his father is an evil sinner to be
shunned.""
The appellate court reversed. It said it was "sensitive to the
revelation.. . that custody in the mother may breed in John
Edward a lack of religious and filial rapport with his father
and the father's parents, and may possibly breed definite
antipathy to his father and his paternal grandparents." 2 It
agreed "that this probability is not for the best interests of
John Edward." 3 However, it said, "The fact that judged by
the common norm, it may be logically concluded that custody
in the father is for the child's best interests, does not warrant
us in taking custody away from the mother when such an order
must be bottomed on our opinion that the mother's religious
beliefs and teachings, in their effect on the child, are and
continue to be contrary to the child's best interests." 4 The
court concluded that it had to reverse the trial judge in the
absence of evidence "which will sustain a finding that there
is actual impairment of physical, emotional and mental well-
being contrary to the best interests of the child." 5
One might well feel some intuitive attraction to the appellate
court's result. Child-custody questions are decided according
to the best interests of the child. If Mrs. Quiner's religious
understandings were correct, nothing was as crucial to her
son's interests than that he should be raised in her religion.
9. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 527 (trial court opinion).
10. Id. at 532 (trial court opinion).
11. Id. at 526 (trial court opinion).
12. Id. at 513.
13. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14.
14. Id. at 518.
15. Id. at 516.
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The court's result is appealingly responsive to this possibility.
In addition, the trial court had perhaps been unsympathetic
to Mrs. Quiner's religious beliefs, and its opinion thus was
perhaps open to the reading that the court was officially
judging their merits. Such a judgment is, I would suppose,
uncontroversially outside the scope of a court's authority, just
as a ruling that Mrs. Quiner's religious understandings were
correct would have been. Nevertheless, I will argue that the
appellate court's reasoning was unpersuasive and that its
doctrinal position was not sound.
The court deployed several arguments. At their rhetorical
epicenter was the accusation that Mrs. Quiner had been
"punished" for her religious views: "Deprivation of the custody
of a child is not a 'slender' punishment: it is a heavy penalty
to pay for the exercise of a religious belief, neither illegal nor
immoral." 6 I believe, however, that the court both misunder-
stood what a punishment is and what custody cases are about.
A punishment is intended as a judgment of someone who
has done something wrong. It seeks to condemn behavior, to
prevent its repetition, and to deter others from emulating it.
As James Fitzjames Stephen memorably wrote, a punishment
"is to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any
offence what a seal is to hot wax. It converts into a permanent
final judgment what might otherwise be a transient sentiment
.... [T]he infliction of punishment by law gives definite
expression and a solemn ratification and justification to the
hatred which is excited by the commission of the offence ....
A ruling in a custody case, on the other hand, has no such
damnifying intentions. A divorce court must choose which of
two parents is to have custody of their child. In doing so, it
does not decide which is the better or more deserving person.
Rather, it must apply the "best interests of the child" test.
That is, it must decide which parent the child would be better
off with. That decision is not intended as ajudgment of either
parent. Not infrequently, a court must choose between two
admirable people, and wishes to condemn neither. Sometimes
the more admirable person-sometimes even the more
admirable parent-would be the less successful custodian,
perhaps because the child has closer relations with the less
16. Id. at 517 (citation omitted). For another such characterization, see Mangrum,
supra note 1, at 30.
17. 2 JAMES F. SrmlfEN, A HIS1ORY OF ThE CEMDA LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (Burt Franklin
1964) (1888).
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admirable parent. No praise or blame is intended in the
circumstance. The dissent in Quiner was thus right when it
said, "The judgment of the trial court is neither designed,
intended nor operative as a penalty upon appellant .... ."18
Under the trial court's decision, Mrs. Quiner did not get what
she wanted, and she surely was made deeply unhappy, but not
because she was penalized.
Even if it did not penalize Mrs. Quiner, the Quiner trial
court's conclusion would still be inappropriate if it represented
a decision that one religion was inferior to another.'9 This is
clearly what the appellate court thought the trial court had
done. The appellate court said, "Precisely because a court
cannot know one way or another, with any degree of certainty,
the proper or sure road to personal security and happiness or
to religious salvation ... ,evaluation of religious teaching and
training and its projected as distinguished from immediate
effect... upon the physical, mental and emotional well-being
of a child, must be forcibly kept from judicial determinations."2 °
No one, I think, doubts that a secular court should not
"entangle" itself with religion to the extent of deciding which
religion is better. But a custody court is not trying to identify
the road to salvation. On the contrary, it must disavow any
such foolhardiness. But it can say that one religion's secular
effects are less desirable than the secular effects of the other
parent's ideology or religion. It is trying to choose between
the two available roads to "personal security and happiness"
in the secular sense of those terms. This is what the best-
interest inquiry is all about.
The appellate court's characterization of the trial court's
ruling as a punishment, and indeed the former's very holding,
apparently arose from its implicit assumption that Mrs. Quiner
had some kind of a right to raise her child in the religion she
preferred. The appellate court, in other words, seemed to
understand the trial court's result as denying Mrs. Quiner her
right to custody for religious reasons. But I believe that the
appellate court was mistaken in assuming that, as against Mr.
Quiner, Mrs. Quiner had a right to custody of their child. To
18. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 519 (Herndon, J., dissenting).
19. For the suggestion that this was the court's intent in Quiner, see, e.g., Beschle,
supra note 1, at 401.
20. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
[VOL. 25:3 & 4
Religion And Child Custody 885
see why that assumption was incorrect as the appellate court
understood it, let us examine the reasons we attribute rights
to parents.
The first basis for attributing to parents a right to raise their
child in whatever religion they choose is that doing so generally
benefits parents.21 More particularly, the argument is that,
often for explicitly theological reasons and usually for
emotional reasons, parents commonly and passionately want
to bring up their children in their own religion. They want
to do so because part of their concern for their child is a
concern for its welfare, and nothing more touches that welfare
to a believing parent than the condition of the child's eternal
soul. They also may believe that the child's temporal happiness
is to be found in the solace of their faith and the guidance of
their God. Further, parents want their children to be good
people, a goal which for many parents is inextricably bound
up with religion. Yet further, parents yearn to perpetuate their
own lives through their children, by seeing their children carry
on their beliefs and customs. Finally, for some parents an
integral part of practicing their religion is raising their children
in it. "And, ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath:
but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord."
Ordinarily, all these arguments combine to provide a widely
accepted basis for deferring to parental religious decisions even
where we have strong secular reasons to doubt their wisdom
and to regret their consequences. However, when divorcing
parents disagree about their child's religious status, these
arguments apply equally to both parents' preferences. And
we have no basis for deciding which parent's interests to prefer.
The interests are the same interests. The two parents have
the same claim to advance those interests. Mrs. Quiner may
have had a right to control her child's religious upbringing;
but Mr. Quiner had the same right. To put the point crudely,
the two rights cancelled each other. As between the Quiners,
neither had a claim to custody which gave one but not the other
a presumptive right to custody.
A second basis for attributing rights to parents is that doing
so is generally good for their children. We assume that parents
know what is best for their children because they love and
know them best. Further, we are willing to believe that it is
21. My discussion of the bases for parental rights is drawn from Carl E. Schneider,
Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L. REV. 151, 158-61 (1988).
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good for children to be raised in a religion, yet a liberal state
is barred from making any such decision for children. To put
the point rather differently, children may have powerful
religious interests, but they are usually thought incompetent
to assert them. Neither may the state assert them. Parents,
however, are commonly taken to be their children's "next
friend," and thus to be the most suitable people to identify and
pursue their children's religious claims.
The problem with this second basis of parental rights in the
custody context resembles the problem with the first basis.
In custody battles, the two parental "experts" disagree about
what religion is best for their children, and we have to choose
between them. Yet we are barred from deciding on the basis
of which religion is preferable. We have only our standard
secular categories to consult. If we refrain from using those
standards fully because of a fear of interfering with one
parent's prerogatives, we interfere with the prerogatives of
the other parent.
In addition, the parental rights that rest on the good those
rights do children are weakened on divorce because some of
our assumptions about parental decisions for children are
shaken by the divorce. We fear that divorcing parents will
have become so absorbed in their hostilities with each other
that their concern for their children may be temporarily
diminished and that they might even use their children in their
battles. We may assume before a divorce that "each spouse
teaches love and respect for the other, if for no reason other
than the teaching of such love and respect is for the best
interest of the child."22 But in a divorce, the spouses have often
lost those feelings for each other and no longer teach them to
their children.
Our third basis for attributing rights to parents is that doing
so indirectly promotes pluralism, "that is, society's interest
in social and ideological diversity."' By protecting parents'
choices about how to live, parental-rights doctrine helps
maintain a pool of different cultural communities. It does so
by allowing people to live as they wish without interference
and to perpetuate their beliefs by teaching them to the next
generation.
22. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
23. Schneider, supra note 21, at 160.
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According people like Mrs. Quiner a right to control the
religious upbringing of the Quiners' children might promote
pluralism better than failing to do so. Failing to do so could
somewhat disadvantage members of some heterodox religions
in some custody disputes. This could make membership in such
religions marginally less attractive and make it marginally
less likely that children will be brought up in them. However,
the injury to any social pluralism-interest from failing to accord
Mrs. Quiner a right to decide how her child is to be raised is
likely to be sharply limited. Relatively few children will be
involved in these cases. Most divorcing parents will roughly
agree about religion, and most divorcing parents (the
conventional estimate is 90%) work out some settlement on
their own. Further, even if people like Mrs. Quiner do not have
the kind of right the court seems to attribute to them, they
may still win a custody dispute, as I will suggest in a moment.
Finally, custody disputes do not pose a choice between a
heterodox religion and some state orthodoxy: The choice must
be between the heterodox religion and whatever views the other
parent espouses. Mr. Quiner, it should be recalled, was himself
a member of another sect of the Plymouth Brethren.'
Attributing rights to parents on "pluralism" grounds is
justified on the basis of a general social interest. On this view,
Mr. Quiner's claim does not directly offset Mrs. Quiner's as
it did with respect to the two other bases for parental rights.
Nevertheless, we ought not promote that social interest without
seeing whether it conflicts with the claims of people like Mr.
Quiner. Can we serve society's pluralism interests without
improperly disserving his interests? I doubt that we can. A
brief discussion of the effects of the Quiner rule may help show
why.
24. The reasoning in Quiner and some other cases which assume that the member
of the heterodox religion has a right to custody seems to have been influenced by the
mother's "presumptive right" to custody under the tender-years doctrine, which held that
mothers should have custody of young children. However, that theory is now widely
rejected, is constitutionally dubious at best, and conflicts with much current thinking
about what is good for children. Even when Quiner and its confreres were decided, the
doctrine was nothing more than a generalization about what is good for a child. There
was nothing in the generalization that had to prevent courts from asking whether the
generalization was true in any particular case. Thus the presumption did not have to
be, and should not have been, understood as creating the kind of right the Quiner court
assumed existed.
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992]
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Far from being "neutral," the Quiner test disadvantages
parents who are not members of what we may call other-
worldly sects. Members of such separatist sects tend to be
governed in all aspects of their lives by their religion.
Excluding religiously based behavior from consideration in
custody disputes involving a member of an other-worldly sect
excludes almost everything from consideration. The tendency
of the Quiner rule, then, is to eliminate all evidence that might
weaken the claim of the unworldly parent while accepting any
evidence that tends to weaken the other parent's claim. The
(relatively) worldly parent is comparatively disadvantaged at
least in this sense: if someone did the things Mrs. Quiner did
for non-religious reasons, they would count against her;
because Mrs. Quiner had religious reasons, they were not
counted against her. She is "immunized" by her religious
views; he is not. Finally, whatever logic may require, I think
the psychological effect of the Quiner attitude is to lead courts
to avoid letting the unworldly parent lose. All these factors,
I think, help account for the paucity-perhaps even the
absence-of cases in which the court adopts the Quiner
principle and also denies custody to the member of the other-
worldly sect. Once again, in short, we find that the Quiner
rule is defensible only if the interests of Mr. Quiner are
ignored.
I have been suggesting that the Quiner court's opinion makes
sense only on the assumption that Mrs. Quiner had a right
to control her child's upbringing. I have reasoned that while
the Quiners together no doubt had such a right against the
state, she had no such right against her husband. My
arguments, I think, further allow us to see why the Quiner
court was mistaken when it relied on the following argument:
"We assume that if the parties had remained married,... there
could be no doubt that intervention by the state in John
Edward's upbringing would not receive hospitable consideration
in any court."2' True enough, as far as it goes. But the Quiners'
decision to get divorced required the court to choose between
them on the basis of the upbringing of their child, a requirement
that, short of child abuse or neglect, is not present in the case
of the undivorced couple. In addition, as I suggested above,
the now-hostile relations of the parents make us doubt some
of the reasons we ordinarily have for not intervening in an
25. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
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intact family. For both those reasons the state may-even
must-"intervene" during the Quiners' divorce even though
it could not do so during the marriage.
How, then, should a court treat a case like Quiner? I do not
see any wholly satisfactory principle. However, I would
propose that a court treat such cases no differently from the
other custody cases it considers. It should look to everything
that might affect the child's best interests. It should consider
all the behavior and attitudes that might affect a parent's
qualities as a guardian, without looking into the religious or
ideological basis for them. I think I would adopt this test
knowing that it will not measure all that is in the child's best
interest, because much that affects that interest cannot, as
the Quiner court insists, be evaluated by a secular court. But
I would adopt it on the grounds that we cannot afford to
exclude any factors that are within the capacity of a secular
court to comprehend and because I think it treats both parties
as fairly as a secular court can reasonably manage.
To be sure, there must be some discomfort in evaluating even
the secular behavioral consequences of religious beliefs.
Nevertheless, it is hardly new law that courts may attempt
to do so. A standard, if not entirely happy, citation is Reynolds
v. United States.26  Another example comes from the law of
divorce: One spouse's religious beliefs cannot give the other
grounds for divorce, but that spouse's behavior may do so even
if it is religiously motivated.27 And as to children, the Supreme
Court said in Prince v. Massachusetts,' "Acting to guard the
general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens
patriae may well restrict the parent's control by requiring
school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor,
and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely
because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's
course of conduct on religion or conscience. "29 Finally, the
principle that courts should look only at the secular aspects
of a dispute that is essentially over religion is standard in
cases in which courts try to resolve church disputes over
26. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
27. Molish v. Mollish, 494 S.w.2d 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
28. 321 U.S. 158 (1943).
29. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted).
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property by looking as much as possible to secular issues, even
though such decisions may have large spiritual consequences. 3°
For that matter, even Quiner does not wholly reject consid-
ering religiously-motivated behavior. It employs this standard:
"Evidence must be produced which will sustain a finding that
there is actual impairment of physical, emotional and mental
well-being contrary to the best interests of the child."M' This
standard is intended to exclude "projected as distinguished
from immediate effect[s]" of parental behavior.3 2
This attempt to cabin a court's examination of the secular
effects of religious beliefs seems to me unconvincing. I find
it puzzling to exclude "projected as distinguished from immedi-
ate effect[s]," since the whole point of a custody decision is to
decide what will happen to the child in the future, a future
often ranging into many years.' The requirement of demon-
strating actual, immediate harm is thus inappropriate in a
custody hearing, particularly since the situation in which the
child will be living (with only one parent) will not really have
been established by the time of most trials. The inappropri-
ateness of the test is demonstrated by Quiner itself. The court
acknowledged, "There is no evidence, and indeed it may have
been too early to accumulate any evidence, that the doctrine
of separation had in any manner affected the child's physical,
emotional or mental well-being."3' This is plausible enough,
since the boy was hardly more than two years old at the time
of the trial and had been in the father's custody for two years
by the time of the appellate court decision. Quiner seems to
anticipate that a later court would readily change the custody
order if any such evidence developed.35 But in fact courts are
30. E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
31. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
32. Id. To similar effect is another often-cited test: "[T]he court must make a
threshold factual determination that the child's temporal well-being is immediately and
substantially endangered by the religious practice in question and, if that threshold
determination is made, second, the court must engage in a deliberate and articulated
balancing of the conflicting interests involved, to the end that its custody order makes
the least possible infringement upon the parent's liberty interests consistent with the
child's well-being." Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1030 (Me. 1980).
33. Indeed, the tender-years presumption on which the Quiner court cheerfully relied,
59 Cal. Rptr. at 508, is exactly such a projection.
34. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
35. Id. at 517-18.
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appropriately reluctant to alter custody once it has been
established. In short, the dissent again had the better of the
argument when it said (perhaps too emphatically) that courts
"should be permitted to exercise such judgment to the end that
crippling injuries may be prevented rather than being limited
to attempting to correct them after the fact."'
The test I propose is certainly unsatisfactory in some ways.
In particular, it may tend to somewhat disadvantage parents
who are members of particularly unworldly sects. It must
always be hard for the world to understand, evaluate, and deal
with unworldly people, and the world'sjudges may thus regard
the situation of a child in an unworldly home less sympatheti-
cally than is just. My test would similarly disadvantage children
who would be spiritually or even secularly better off brought
up in such sects. Nevertheless, the test seems to me less
problematic than these criticisms may make it appear.
A primary defense of my test is, as I have already argued,
the absence of any satisfactory alternative. Further, the
disadvantage to the unworldly parent should not be exaggerated.
For instance, she gets the benefit of the things her religion
does to strengthen her ties with her children and to make them
happier and better.37 In addition, the unworldly parent finds
important protection in the fact that my test requires courts
to look at everything that affects the child's best interests as
a whole, not just at the parts affected by religion. At least in
current thinking, the child's emotional relationship with its
parents will be crucial to his best interests. Unhappily, it seems
to be a fault of cases of the Quiner sort that these crucial factors
are regularly lost track of in the heat of the dispute over how
the court should treat religiously motivated behavior. Finally,
we ought not over-dramatize the danger that judges may lack
sympathy for the heterodox religions these cases involve. True,
there is evidence of such a judicial attitude, particularly in
a few of the trial court opinions. But there is much more
36. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (Herndon, J., dissenting). Or, as another court put it: "Given
the necessarily uncertain nature of psychological evaluation and diagnosis and the
potential for severe future psychological impairment to result from practices which do
not have present demonstrable effects upon the child, we conclude that evidence of beliefs
or practices which are reasonably likely to cause present or future harm to the child is
admissible in a custody proceeding." In re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo.
1985).
37. For an investigation of"possible secular purposes and effects that might support
the use of religion as an element in child custody and adoption determinations," see Beschle,
supra note 1, at 406-16.
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substantial evidence, including the appellate court opinion in
Quiner, that courts have been aware of just that danger and
have leaned over backwards to avoid it.3
38. As I said earlier, this Essay is not intended as an exercise in constitutional analysis,
but rather seeks to ask what good public policy in these cases would be. Nevertheless,
I think I may owe a word of explanation about Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984),
since it might seem to present so precisely analogous a problem as to dictate a plain result
in cases like Quiner. In Palmore, a girl's parents sought a divorce, and the mother won
custody of her. Thereafter, the father sought to have that decision modified on the grounds
that the mother was living with (and later married) a Black man. The trial court granted
the father's request on the ground that, in the Florida town in which the mother lived,
the child would soon suffer from "social stigmatization" because of her mother's marriage.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, saying that the "effects of racial prejudice,
however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody
of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to have such custody." Id. at
434.
I do not think that Palmore substantially undercuts the arguments I have made, if
indeed it undercuts them at all. For one thing, that case is, at best, only slightly on point.
Palmore seems in large part to have been a statement that courts may not give effect
to racial prejudice by recognizing its consequences in custody cases. Factually, the whole
problem in Palmore was that people would treat the child badly because they disapproved
of her mother's husband's race. In contrast, relatively little of the problem in Quiner
involved reflected social disapproval of Mrs. Quiner. Rather, that case had to do with
the isolation from society and from his family that Mrs. Quiner would require of her child.
Suppose, though, that social disapproval of Mrs. Quiner's religion had been a more
prominent part of the case. It is not obvious that social disapproval of a religion should
be treated in the same way as social disapproval of interracial marriage. Given the special
status of race in American history and constitutional law, the latter disapproval is hard
to countenance. But disapproval of one religion is often instinct in approval of another
religion. Religions regularly claim an exclusive insight into truth and regularly condemn
those who reject that insight. "He that is not with me is against me: and he that gathereth
not with me scattereth abroad." Implicit in religious freedom, therefore, is freedom to
disapprove of the religion of others.
In any event, Palmore's rationale is obscure and leaves many unanswered questions.
For one thing, the Court may have fallen into the same error into which the Quiner court
fell. The Court asked whether the "possible injury" to the child was a "permissible consider-
ation[] for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother." Id. at 433.
The Palmore Court, like the Quiner court, seemed to assume that the mother had some
kind of a right against the father to custody. But Palmore, like Quiner, was a custody
case, and neither parent had a better claim than the other. The only factor that might
have given the mother in Palmore a stronger claim than the father was that the case
involved a request to modify custody, not an initial custody decision. But it is not clear
that that fact ought to have constitutional weight.
Second, Palmore's methodology was notably obscure. The Court started off by stating
the usual "compelling state interest" test. Next it conceded that "granting custody based
on the best interests of the child is indisputably a substantial governmental interest."
Id. at 433. But then it quickly concluded that the possible injury to the child was not
a permissible consideration. What happened to the compelling-state-interest test? The
point of that test is presumably to make otherwise impermissible considerations permissible
where the government interest is strong enough. If, on the other hand, considering this
kind of injury to the child is flatly and always impermissible, why open by invoking the
compelling-state-interest test?
Palmore might be read as being about the possibility that social prejudice may distort
a court's attempt to gauge accurately the effect of racial hostility on a child. The Court,
for instance, quoted a passage which speaks of'officials "bowing to the hypothetical effects
of private racial prejudice.'" Id. (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-61
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How would my test work out in Quiner? What should the
trial court have done? Unfortunately, we know far too little
about the case to answer those questions thoroughly. However,
we can say something. In particular, several of the factors the
trial court looked to do seem to me to count against Mrs.
Quiner.
First, living as separately from the world as John Edward
Quiner was expected to do might well, as the trial court noted,
limit his chances of prospering in the world, and could actively
reduce his happiness. For one thing, as Leo Pfeffer wrote, "It
is a plausible supposition that children reared in unpopular,
extreme or fanatical faiths are likely to be less happy and less
well adjusted socially than those brought up in the faiths
accepted by the community."39 To be sure, this is rather a
speculative argument. But neither is it implausible to think,
for example, that children made to isolate themselves every
day in school and out will have troubled and anxious relations
with other children.'
(197 1) (White, J., dissenting)). Such a reading would have some real plausibility at least
in social-policy terms. The difficulty with this reading, though, is that the Court ultimately
does not seem to have intended it. Thus, for instance, the opinion closed by saying that
the "effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify" this racial classification.
Id. at 434.
Third, it is not entirely clear that the child's best interest ought to have been ignored
in Palmore. Assuming, as the Court seems to have done, that the trial court was right
about the injury to the child, is it proper to make that child suffer to promote the general
social principles with which the Court is concerned? The Court noted that it had earlier
overturned a statute prohibiting Blacks from buying houses in white neighborhoods.
The statute purported to "'promote the public peace by preventing race conflicts.'" Id.
(quoting Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,81 (1917)). But the damage that statute was
intended to prevent was of a relatively diffuse and general kind which would be suffered
by society at large. The injury in Palmore was a relatively concrete and specific injury
to be suffered by an identifiable person, and, worse, a person too young to protect herself
easily or possibly even to understand what was happening to her.
In the end, perhaps Palmore is best understood as resembling Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948). Shelley was a response to the special history of race in American life.
It has survived despite its severe conceptual difficulties because it was such a response.
("Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Vinson did not satisfactorily articulate the reasoning
that underlay Shelley's holding, courts and commentators have characteristically viewed
Shelley with suspicion." LAURENCE I-L TRIBE, AMEICAN CONSITIVIIONAL LAW 1711-12 (1988)).
But it has generally not been extended.
39. Leo Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U. L. REV. 333, 366
(1955).
40. Some courts that have considered this kind of situation have argued that it is
positively beneficial. As one court remarked in a Jehovah's Witnesses case: "We are
not unaware that deviation from the normal often brings ridicule and criticism. We reject,
however, the notion that it is necessarily the basis for implanting neuroses. Criticism
is the crucible in which character is tested. Conformity stifles the intellect fathering
decadency." Smith v. Smith, 367 P.2d 230, 233 (Ariz. 1961).
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Somewhat more substantially, we might legitimately worry
that John Edward would receive less education than he needed
to prosper in the world. Perhaps if he chose to live outside
of the world, his modest education might not concern us. But
eventually he might well abandon his mother's beliefs. To be
sure, the Court rejected this kind of argument in Wisconsin
v. Yoder.4' But there the Court had special reasons (however
convincing) to believe that the substitute education the Amish
offered their children would suffice.42
Second, the trial court may have had some reason to fear
that Mrs. Quiner would give too little attention to her child,
since she was apparently devoting a great deal of time to reli-
gious activities. 4 That court also reasonably feared that she
would have to separate herself from her son if he failed to join
the sect when that became possible (which could be as early
as five or six years old) or if he left it. 44 It is hardly unheard
of for religions to ask much of their adherents: "Verily I say
unto you, There is no man that hath left house, or parents,
or brethren, or wife, or children, for the kingdom of God's sake,
Who shall not receive manifold more in this present time, and
in the world to come life everlasting." But a secular court may
still ask whether such devotion is good for the abandoned
brethren, wives, and children.
The third, and I think most consequential, problem with Mrs.
Quiner's claim was the possibility that, had the child lived with
her, he might easily (probably) have been alienated from his
father, a result we may reasonably think would injure the boy
(and, for that matter, the father). Perhaps, as the appellate
court thought, this was not a certainty, but the dissent's
concern is reasonable enough: "Appellant's suggestion that
her son could 'love and obey' his father although unable to eat
with him and although taught constantly to be on guard lest
41. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42. In addition, as Pfeffer also observed, "Our culture values literacy high and the
community has a strong interest in the development of an educated citizenry, and
therefore a correspondingly strong interest that children shall not be brought up in a
religion which precludes participation in secular education." Pfeffer, supra note 39, at
339 (citations omitted).
43. The dissent noted that Mrs. Quiner testified that she devoted "six nights per
week and practically all day every Sunday" to her religious observances. Quiner, 59 Cal.
Rptr. at 533 (Herndon, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested that that schedule "leaves
practically no time for her to spend in the normal activities of mother and child in
training, recreation and otherwise attending to her child's needs." Id.
44. Id. at 522 & n.3 (trial court opinion).
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he be contaminated by his father's spiritual uncleanliness, is
semantically a contradiction in terms, and emotionally, an
esoteric subtlety far beyond the grasp of a mind more mature
than this unfortunate child's."'
Along similar lines, the trial court might legitimately
consider, as courts regularly do, how willing each parent was
to make visitation easy for the other. As the dissent noted,
both Mrs. Quiner and her apparently strong-minded father
(with whom Mrs. Quiner was living) "candidly admit that [Mr.
Quiner] would not be welcome in their home and that they
would prevent all visitation if they were legally permitted to
do so."' In view of the intractable difficulty of enforcing
visitation rights and of the determination of some custodial
parents adamantly to impede visitation, there is something
to be said, ceteris paribus, for giving custody to the parent
most likely to cooperate with visitation.
All this being said, however, it does not ineluctably follow
that Mr. Quiner should necessarily have won. As the appellate
court insisted, there was no way of knowing to a certainty just
how Mrs. Quiner would in fact have acted over the years had
she obtained custody. More significantly, there is much we
do not know about the two parents. Most particularly, we
know little about the quality of the emotional relations
between each of them and their son. Those relations are
ordinarily thought critical to any custody claim, and we would
need to know much more about them before we could reach
a sustainable result in Quiner. Mrs. Quiner's ties to her son
and his to her might very well have easily outweighed all the
supposed secular drawbacks of her religious views.
In defending the rule I propose and in essaying some
comments on the correct result in Quiner I do not mean to
suggest that it will be easy for a court to evaluate fair-mindedly
the lives members of other-worldly religions lead. The trial
court in Quiner was clearly dubious and perhaps uncharitable
about Mrs. Quiner's household. But hear from another witness,
Edmund Gosse, who wrote a wonderful memoir of his youth
among the Plymouth Brethren:
45. Id. at 520 (Herndon, J., dissenting). For another too-easy dismissal of the plight
of a "disfellowshipped" father, see Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1948).
46. 59 Cal. Rptr. at 521 (Herndon, J., dissenting).
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992]
896 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform V
It is so generally taken for granted that a life strictly
dedicated to religion is stiff and dreary, that I may have
some difficulty in persuading my readers that ... we were
always cheerful and often gay.... My Father and Mother
lived so completely in the atmosphere of faith, and were
so utterly convinced of their intercourse with God, that,
so long as that intercourse was not clouded by sin, to
which they were delicately sensitive, they could afford to
take the passing hour very lightly. They would even, to
a certain extent, treat the surroundings of their religion
as a subject of jest, joking very mildly and gently about
such things as an attitude at prayer or the nature of a
supplication....
... The mere fact that I had no young companions, no
story books, no outdoor amusements, none of the thousand
and one employments provided for other children in more
conventional surroundings, did not make me discontented
or fretful, because I did not know of the existence of such
entertainments. In exchange, I became keenly attentive
to the limited circle of interests open to me.47
Neither, on the other hand, should the life of other-worldly
sects be romanticized. Gosse concludes his book in a much
more anguished tone:
Let me speak plainly. After my long experience, after
my patience and forbearance, I have surely the right to
protest against the untruth (would that I could apply to
it any other word!) that evangelical religion, or any
religion in a violent form, is a wholesome or valuable or
desirable adjunct to human life .... It sets up a vain,
chimerical ideal, in the barren pursuit of which all the
tender, indulgent affections, all the genial play of life, all
the exquisite pleasures and soft resignations of the body,
all that enlarges and calms the soul, are exchanged for
what is harsh and void and negative.'
In sum, there is no easy way out for us when we confront
cases like Quiner. Courts must somehow resolve custody
47. EDMuND GOSSE, FATHER AND SON: A STUDY OF Two TaERAMENTS 29-30 (2d ed.
1949).
48. Id. at 246.
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disputes between divorcing parents, even when those disputes
involve a parent's religious beliefs. We cannot specially defer
to one parent's religiously motivated preferences without
illegitimately depreciating the other parent's preferences,
however motivated. We are thus thrown back on the secular
standard by which we judge all custody disputes-the best
interest of the child. As we have seen, the child's best interest
will sometimes be affected by parental behavior which has
religious roots. This should not deter courts from considering
how that behavior will affect the child. Courts doing so will
not, however, be evaluating the parent's religious beliefs; they
will be evaluating only the secular effect of those beliefs. Such
courts will be swayed by things seen and unseen. Some of
them will no doubt judge the behavior of the unworldly
harshly; others will no doubt judge it sentimentally. But I can
think of no satisfactory rule that might prevent them from
doing so. What we must work toward here, as elsewhere in
the law of child custody, are courts that try as diligently and
earnestly as possible to encourage parents to agree on their
own to custody arrangements they would find satisfactory and
that try, when all else fails, to decipher the child's best
interests as thoughtfully and decently as possible.49
III.
We have been looking at cases in which courts have tended,
with some exceptions, to labor to avoid examining religiously
motivated behavior. We now turn to cases in which they
almost seem eager to do just the opposite. These are cases in
which courts try to regulate conflicts over religion between
the custodial and the non-custodial parent after divorce.
We will begin our discussion of this problem by examining
LeDoux v. LeDoux.5 ° We will do so because it is one of the most
sympathetic cases for judicial intervention to settle a post-
divorce conflict over religion. It presents a regularly recurring
problem-the possibility that a child is being injured by each
parent's insistence on practicing and teaching his or her own
religion.
49. In brief, I am saying that we will have to rely more than we might like on judicial
discretion. For an extended, if studiously guarded, defense ofjudicial discretion in custody
decisions, see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the
UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215 (1991).
50. 452 N.w.2d 1 (Neb. 1990).
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992]
898 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Edward and Diane LeDoux were married in 1977 in a Roman
Catholic church. Their children, Andrew and Peter, were
baptized as Catholics, and Andrew attended a parochial school.
In 1985, however, Mr. LeDoux became a Jehovah's Witness.
In 1987, Ms. LeDoux began proceedings which led to a divorce.
She was awarded custody of their children. The trial court
found "that exposing the minor children to more than one
religious practice would have a deleterious effect upon the
minor children."5' Mr. LeDoux thus received a court order
which directed him "not to 'expose or permit himself or any
other person to expose the minor children of the parties to any
religious practices or teachings that are inconsistent with the
religious teachings espoused by Mrs. LeDoux being the
Catholic religion by which the children are being raised.'"
52
The Nebraska Supreme Court found "ample evidence to
conclude that the stress Andrew was experiencing posed an
immediate and substantial threat to his well-being," 53 and it
thus affirmed the trial court's order.
The court had its reasons. They rested primarily on the
ground that Andrew was suffering from the tension between
his parents over religion. The principal evidence for that
theory came from "Dr. Joseph L. Rizzo, a certified clinical
psychologist who had counseled Andrew. " '4 He "indicated that
conflicts in the Catholic and Jehovah's Witnesses religions
were an obvious contributing factor to the stress felt and
manifested by Andrew. Dr. Rizzo testified that Andrew was
quite uncomfortable and fearful about visits with his father."
55
After each of several visits, "Andrew [then about six] wet
himself and had the equivalent of a nightmare."56 The
psychologist felt that "'the religious aspect would be a part
of it.'"57 He also believed "'that Andy is diagnosable of having
a maladjustment problem currently. Yes, he is under stress.
Yes, it is serious. It is not the most serious, but it is signifi-
cant.'"'
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 4-5.
53. Id. at 5.
54. 452 N.W.2d at 3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. (quoting testimony of Dr. Rizzo).
58. 452 N.W.2d at 4 (quoting testimony of Dr. Rizzo).
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In short, there was in LeDoux a real argument that Andrew
was directly suffering from the effects of Mr. LeDoux's asser-
tion of his interest in teaching his child his religion. The court
in LeDoux was surely correct in believing that at some point
a parent's interests-even though they are interests in reli-
gion-are outweighed by the interests of her children. But
what standard ought to be used to identify that point?
59
Courts deciding cases like LeDoux tend to use the same
standard in these disputes that they use in custody decisions,
namely, the best-interest standard. That standard is, of
course, quite tolerant of judicial intervention, since it seems
to invite courts to try to optimize the child's circumstances.
As I argued earlier, courts should be more willing to intervene
in divorced families than in intact families: We assume
parents in the latter families work together for the good of
their child. We are afraid that in the former families the
parents' dislike for each other may distract them from the
child's good and may make them willing to use the child to
hurt each other. To put the point differently, we accord
parents rights because we assume they are the best decision-
makers for their own children. But people in and after a
divorce are often wrapped up in a battle with each other, and
they may only too easily lose sight of their children's interests.
Thus using a relatively accommodating standard for judicial
intervention in post-divorce families has some appeal.
The obvious alternative standard is the one used in child
abuse and neglect cases, which in recent years has tended to
become a fairly high standard, thus, making intervention more
difficult. This standard, however, can let go by some pretty
clearly harmful things. This may be tolerable under our
ordinary assumptions about "intact" families, but it may seem
less wise when we are dealing with post-divorce families.
Nevertheless, the court's order in LeDoux seems to me
problematic. Its problems begin to emerge as we examine its
basis. In part, the order appeared to rest on the conventional
doctrine that the custodial parent controls the child's religious
upbringing. That doctrine may be a good general principle,
particularly against the claims of anyone other than the non-
custodial parent. It certainly reflects the reality that the
59. Note, however, that courts often intervene without bothering to state a standard.
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custodial parent will have the most contact with and control
over the child and thus be able to exert the most influence on
the child's religion.
However, I think that the doctrine is not good policy if it
means the custodial parent (again, usually the mother) can
recruit judicial power to prevent the non-custodial parent from
seeking to influence his child's religious views even where that
effort is not clearly causing acute harm. Here, as in the
category of cases we just discussed, the interests of both
parents need to be accommodated. Even after divorce, the non-
custodial parent (for simplicity's sake, the father) continues,
and presumably should continue, to have an interest in his
child and to be responsible for its support. It is thus hard to
see why his interest in the child's religion (which we outlined
above and which may be of urgent personal importance to him)
should end with the marriage.
Not only does the father's interest argue against facile
judicial intervention in religious disputes after divorce. So
does the standard principle that courts should avoid making
decisions about families where they can be avoided. Courts
must make decisions about custody because the child's family
cannot make a necessary decision. On the other hand, ques-
tions about what the non-custodial parent does during visita-
tion regarding religion may not need to be resolved. And
where they need not be, they should not be.
Thus, I believe that the very accommodating best-interest
standard should be used only to decide who should have
custody and should not be used in deciding whether a court
should resolve a dispute over religion between divorced
parents. The best-interest standard is always troublesome
because it ignores parental interests; it is particularly trouble-
some here because it is likely to ignore the non-custodial
parent's interest. It has often been criticized for its impre-
cision and because of the discretion it gives judges; here, it
makes intervention markedly too easy.'
In the end, I am not sure that a really good standard can
be articulated, and perhaps the best we can hope is to cultivate
a judicial attitude. I would prefer that that attitude be one
of great reluctance to try to settle disputes over religion after
custody decisions have been made. If I were to adopt a
60. For a lengthy discussion of the problems with and the usefulness of the best-
interest standard, see Schneider, supra note 49.
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standard, it would be at least as restrictive of intervention as
that in Felton v. Felton.6' Felton seems to require some kind
of "'factual showing, not mere conclusions and speculations;
of a substantial injury to the child.62
I favor a reluctance to intervene because I suspect that
in these cases the best may be the enemy of the good, that the
judicial eagerness to prevent all harms to children after
divorce may lead courts to intervene where intervention is
unwise and unprofitable. Let me try to amplify the reasons
for my doubts about intervention. First, courts are poorly
situated to gather, analyze, and evaluate evidence about such
conflicts. To start with, much depends on evaluations of
people's psychological states. We might resist such evaluations
for several reasons. For one thing, much of the evidence is
likely to be from psychologists and psychiatrists, whose
profession may not provide a strong enough basis for any such
judgments and whose services as expert witnesses can too
easily be acquired. Furthermore, as a gentle reference to
Sigmund Freud should suggest, one might also suspect that
some psychiatrists are professionally unsympathetic with
religion. In these religion cases, at least, one too often
encounters signs of such an attitude. In one case, for example,
the Jewish father had remarried and become "extremely devout
and orthodox."' However, the psychiatrist dismissed his
desire that his daughter be brought up Jewish as simply
"predicated on an unconscious selfish motivation."' Similarly,
the psychologist's comment inLeDoux is disquieting: "'There's
no doubt in my mind that Andy is very angry with his father
and that truly the issue of religion could become an unneces-
sary stumbling block. '"' Unnecessary on what principle?
In addition, evaluations of people's situations in these cases
seem to evoke some rather casual, even cavalier, "common
sense" reactions. Consider, for instance, the concurrence's view
in LeDoux: "I do not see how one parent with one set of
religious beliefs and one parent with a different, conflicting
61. 418 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1981).
62. Id. at 611 (quoting appellate court opinion).
63. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 323 N.E.2d 21, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
64. Id.
65. LeDoux, 452 N.w.2d at 9 (Shanahan, J., dissenting) (quoting testimony of Dr.
Rizzo). I see such language and the judicial susceptibility to it as quite consonant with
the trends away from moral and toward psychologic discourse that I describe in Carl
E. Schneider, MoralDiscourse and the TransformationofAmericanFamily Law, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 1803 (1985).
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set of religious beliefs can raise their minor children with full
training and instruction in each parent's beliefs without
reducing their minor children to a totally confused, psychologi-
cally disastrous state."' Similarly confident, sweeping, and
suspect is the assurance of the court in yet another of these
cases: "[I]t is beyond dispute that a young child reared into
two inconsistent religious traditions will quite probably
experience some deleterious physical or mental effects.""7
In short, I think it will often be hard for a court to ascertain
with real precision the psychological nature of a dispute
between divorced parents and thus hard for a court to deal
with such a dispute well. Consider LeDoux. It was not and
possibly could not have been clear there that religion was the
cause of the tensions between the parents or that reducing the
exposure of their child to one religion would end the problem.
Was Andrew's being "very angry" with his father due only to
the conflict over religion? If he was angry that his father's
religious conversion had "caused" the divorce, would that anger
have dissipated had his father obeyed the court's order? Was
Andrew simply reflecting his mother's anger at Mr. LeDoux?
Was Ms. LeDoux angry at her ex-husband because of his
religious views, because he was teaching their children those
views, because those views led to the divorce, or because of
reasons quite unrelated to his views? Would that anger have
dissipated had Mr. LeDoux obeyed the court's order? Could
Andrew's distress have been alleviated in some less drastic
way?68
No doubt the psychologists and courts are right in saying
that the children in these cases are or soon might be in pain.
But some pain is inherent in being a person, in being a child,
66. 452 N.W.2d at 6 (Grant, J., concurring).
67. Morris v. Morris, 412 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
68. As to some of these last questions, the following may be relevant: "On cross-
examination, Dr. Rizzo admitted that Diane LeDoux could have imparted some of her
strong feelings and objections to [Mr. LeDoux's] religion to Andrew, 'but I think also
clearly some of this could be childlike misperceptions on Andy's part himself.'" LeDoux,
452 N.W.2d at 4 (quoting testimony of Dr. Rizzo).
Some courts argue that conflict between the parents over religion may actively benefit
the child. One such court wrote, "There may also be a value in letting the child see, even
at an early age, the religious models between which it is likely to be led to choose in later
life. And it is suggested, sometimes, that a diversity of religious experience is itself a
sound stimulant for a child." Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607-08 (Mass. 1981).
Perhaps this is right. However, to rely on this argument in cases like LeDoux would
be to substitute a rather tenuous hope for some future happiness for the certainty of
present unhappiness.
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and in growing up. Parents always do things that make
children unhappy, and judging by the prevalence of neurosis,
always do things that have lasting harmful effects on children.
It can be difficult for a court to tell when things have gone
beyond that irreducible baseline and to decide what should
be done when they have.
Second, even if a court correctly analyzes a child's plight,
we may doubt that it will often be able to remedy it. This
brings us to a classic and chronic dilemma of family law -the
enforcement problem. In these cases, we have a confluence
of two core enforcement-problem areas-religion and family
life. People have particularly strong motives for following their
own preferences in religion, and it is particularly problematic
for government to monitor what happens in the privacy of
families. Courts will thus often fail to persuade parents who
disagree over religion to do what the judge asks. Take those
problems in the context of LeDoux. How could a court reliably
discover exactly what Mr. LeDoux was telling his children
about religion? And even if he scrupulously obeyed the literal
terms of an order, he and Ms. LeDoux might simply shift the
field of their conflict, so that the harms that once came from
a battle between parents over religion were instead inflicted
in other forums.
In addition, courts will often find themselves unable to
formulate satisfactory remedial orders. Recall the order in
LeDoux, which forbade the father to expose the children to
religious practices or teachings inconsistent with Catholicism.
Such an order is so rife with possibilities for misunderstanding
and varying interpretation that the court seems sadly
optimistic in thinking that "[b]ecause appellant has had previ-
ous exposure to the Catholic religion, he should not have
difficulty in recognizing those beliefs of the Jehovah's
Witnesses and Catholic religions which are conflicting."69 Nor
would it be a welcome task for a court to try to decide when
Mr. LeDoux had violated its order and thus subjected himself
to penalties for contempt. Such a decision would necessarily
require the court to undertake just those doctrinal and
theological inquiries which courts cannot and may not resolve.
Even if all these impediments could be overcome, we would
still want to know whether the benefits of judicial activity
outweigh its costs. These costs are numerous and onerous.
69. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d at 6.
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The financial and emotional burdens of litigation are too well
known to need description. This kind of litigation intrudes
painfully on the privacy of people whose privacy has already
been woefully breached. And it is often said that, especially
in our irredeemably adversary system of justice, litigation
exacerbates the relations between the parties. In LeDoux, for
example, the court's order to a father that he not talk to his
children about or even expose the children to what was most
important to him might only intensify his hostility to his wife,
his anxiety over his children, and his bitterness with the legal
system.
Quite apart from these practical problems with restraining
non-custodial parents in their dealings with their children are
the questions about so directly interfering with their interests
in practicing and preaching their religion. These concerns are
illustrated by cases like Overman v. Overman,7" where a court
required a non-custodial father to take his son to catechism,
and by Pardue v. Pardue,7 where a court threatened to change
the visitation days of a father who would not take his children
to the church of their mother's choice.
I am not suggesting that these are easy cases. Children will
sometimes suffer because of their parents' disputes over
religion. But we live with such disputes and such
consequences between married parents all the time. More
important, I have tried to suggest a number of reasons we
might doubt that judicial attempts to mediate those conflicts
will be successful and might suspect that they will be harmful.
One might object at this point that there is a tension between
my positions on custody and post-divorce cases, and I would
not deny it. My objections to making decisions about a child's
welfare in the latter cases will apply as well to custody
decisions. But there is a crucial difference between the two
categories: Courts have to make custody decisions, and to
make them as well as possible. Courts do not have to iron out
conflicts between custodial and non-custodial parents, unless
those conflicts provoke behavior amounting to child abuse.
Courts must do what courts must do; they should avoid doing
what they can do only badly.
70. 497 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
71. 285 So. 2d 552 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
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IV.
Now that we have completed our brief survey of these two
problems in the relation of law and religion, a few closing
words are in order. A besetting fault of judicial and scholarly
attempts in this area is their conviction that these problems
must have some kind of adequate answer. But, like much else
in law and life, these issues resist satisfactory solution. Let
me speculate briefly about why.
At the beginning of our dilemma is the fact that the dispute
between the spouses is an especially recalcitrant one. They
are arguing over their own religion and over their children,
two of the things most central to their lives and about which
they will feel most adamantly. Further, most Western reli-
gions, and particularly those typically involved in these cases,
stake an exclusive claim to truth and discountenance
compromise. It is these things that the parties really care
about, that they flatly cannot agree about, that the court may
not directly address, and could not solve even if it could
address them.
Another quandary lies in the fact that, ultimately, a secular
court cannot fully accommodate the desires of someone who
wholly rejects secular standards. A court is an instrument
of this world, and will be among the things rejected by someone
who rejects the things of this world. Such a person is simply
using standards which no secular court can adopt, and often
the best such a court can do is to strive to be as understanding
and accommodating as possible while not compromising the
legitimate interests of the other people who are involved in
the dispute.
Yet a further perplexity is that these cases are essentially
about the interests of children. When courts deal with adults,
they rely on the people most affected by the court's decision
to define and assert their own interests. Where children are
concerned, however, such reliance is generally not possible,
because they are too young to determine their own interests.
Sometimes this awkwardness is lessened by the relative ease
of deciding what the child's interest probably is. It is
reasonably uncontroversial to assert, for instance, the child's
interest in not being beaten or molested. But in the cases we
have considered, the dispute centers around the child's
spiritual interests, interests the state is wholly incompetent
to define. Normally, of course, we solve this problem by
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allowing children's parents to identify those interests. Here,
however, their parents disagree precisely on that point.
This leads us to a last puzzle, a puzzle characteristic of
rights discourse in family law.72 Both the child's parents claim
a right to make decisions for their child. And the children
arguably have some kind of right to assert their own prefer-
ences. Yet, while our vocabulary of rights has ample ways of
resolving conflicts between an individual right-holder and the
state, it has no way of resolving such conflicts between rights
holders. Yet so deeply embedded is rights thinking in the
American psyche that the first thought of courts and commen-
tators is to try to cram every legal problem into a rights
category. Thus Mrs. Quiner's claims are automatically ana-
lyzed in rights terms, with the consequence that Mr. Quiner's
interests-and even rights? - are quite lost in the shuffle. And
thus Ms. LeDoux's claims are automatically analyzed in terms
of the prerogatives of the custodial parent, at whatever cost
to Mr. LeDoux's not dissimilar interests.
We should not, then, expect to find any bright-line rule (of
the kind announced in Quiner) that will reliably guide courts
to correct results in these painful cases. If we soften some of
the rigidities of rights thinking in this area, we may find it
easier to cope with what is really going on in these cases. And
that will be all to the good. But we will still find ourselves
relying on fallible judges to make imponderable decisions about
tragic choices.
72. See Schneider, supra note 21, at 157-58.
[VOL. 25:3 & 4
